

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROGER HOEN, et al.,

Defendants, and

WASHINGTON BEER AND WINE
WHOLESALE ASSOCIATION,

Intervenor-Defendant

No. C04-360P

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This matter was tried before the Court from March 21 to March 30, 2006. Plaintiff Costco Wholesale Corporation challenges various Washington state laws and regulations regarding the sale and distribution of beer and wine, particularly policies that tend to increase the average cost of beer and wine to retailers. Defendants are members of the Washington State Liquor Control Board (LCB). The Washington Beer and Wine Wholesalers Association (WBWWA) was granted leave to intervene in this matter as an Intervenor-Defendant.

In prior orders, the Court held that most of the restraints challenged by Costco are irreconcilably in conflict with federal antitrust law, as embodied in the Sherman Act of 1890. At trial,

1 the primary issue was whether the challenged restraints may be upheld as a valid exercise of state
2 power under the Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution, despite their anti-
3 competitive nature.

4 The Sherman Act reflects a strong federal policy in favor of competition. At the same time,
5 the Twenty-first Amendment provides each state with broad authority to regulate alcohol products in
6 order to advance certain “core interests,” such as promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market
7 conditions, and raising revenue. This case requires the Court to consider whether the challenged
8 restraints are effective in advancing the state’s core interests under the Twenty-first Amendment and
9 whether the state’s interests outweigh the federal interests in promoting competition.

10 For the most part, the Court finds that the policies challenged by Costco are not effective in
11 advancing the state’s core interests under the Twenty-first Amendment. The Court also finds that the
12 state’s interests do not trump the federal interest in promoting competition even when the restraints
13 may be minimally effective in advancing the state’s interests.

14 Therefore, having considered the evidence, testimony, and arguments presented by the parties,
15 the Court finds and concludes as follows:

16 (1) The following state restraints are preempted by the federal Sherman Act and are not
17 shielded by the Twenty-first Amendment:

- 18 (a) Policies that require beer and wine distributors and manufacturers to “post”
19 their prices with the state and to “hold” those prices for a full month;
- 20 (b) Policies that require beer and wine distributors to charge uniform prices to all
21 retailers;
- 22 (c) Prohibitions on selling beer and wine to retailers on credit;
- 23 (d) Prohibitions on volume discounts for beer and wine sales;
- 24 (e) Policies that require beer and wine distributors to charge the same “delivered”
25 price to all retailers, regardless of the actual delivery costs;

(f) Prohibitions on central warehousing of beer and wine by retailers; and

(g) Policies that require a 10% minimum mark-up on sales of beer and wine from producers to wholesalers, as well as a 10% minimum mark-up on sales of beer and wine from distributors to retailers.

(2) Costco also challenges Washington's ban on retailers selling beer and wine to other retailers. The Court finds that this policy is a unilateral restraint on trade imposed purely by the state of Washington. As a unilateral restraint, it does not run afoul of the Sherman Act. Therefore, the Court dismisses Costco's antitrust claims regarding the ban on retailer-to-retailer sales of beer and wine.

(3) The Court will stay the judgment in this matter for a period of 30 days while Defendants consider whether to file a notice of appeal in this matter. If Defendants decide to pursue an appeal and wish to seek an extension of the stay pending appeal, they should move promptly for such an extension.

The Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth below.

Framework for Analysis

Defendants¹ argue that the challenged restraints are permissible exercises of state power under the Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourth Circuit has characterized the framework for analyzing a Twenty-first Amendment defense as a three-part inquiry:

(1) First, the court should examine the expressed state interest and the closeness of that interest to those protected by the Twenty-first Amendment.

(2) Second, the court should examine whether, and to what extent, the regulatory scheme serves its stated purpose Simply put, is the scheme effective?

(3) Finally, the court should balance the state's interest . . . (to the extent that interest is actually furthered by the regulatory scheme) against the federal interest in promoting competition under the Sherman Act.

¹ For ease of reference, the Court refers to the LCB and WBWWA collectively as "Defendants."

1 TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 213 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Miller v. Hedlund, 813 F.2d
2 1344, 1352 and n.7 (9th Cir. 1987) (similar).

3 Defendants maintain that the challenged restraints serve three state interests protected by
4 Twenty-first Amendment: (1) promoting temperance; (2) ensuring orderly market conditions; and (3)
5 raising revenue.

6 Findings of Fact

7 1. Costco challenges the following policies regarding the sale and distribution of beer and
8 wine in Washington:

- 9 (a) ***“Posting” Requirement:*** Washington requires manufacturers and distributors
10 of beer and wine to “post” the prices of their products with the LCB. RCW
11 66.28.180(2)-(3); WAC 314-20-100(2) & (5); WAC 314-24-190(2) & (5). The
12 posted prices are publicly available after they take effect.
- 13 (b) ***“Holding” Requirement:*** Beer and wine manufacturers and distributors must
14 “hold” their posted prices for a full month. WAC 314-20-100(2) & (5); WAC
15 314-24-190(2) & (5). That is, they cannot change their posted prices for an
16 entire calendar month.
- 17 (c) ***Uniform Pricing Requirement:*** Distributors must sell their beer and wine
18 products to every retailer at the same price that they have posted with the state.
19 RCW 66.28.170; RCW 66.28.180(2) & (3); WAC 314-12-140; WAC 314-20-
20 100(2), (4) & (5); WAC 314-24-190(2), (4) & (5).
- 21 (d) ***Ban on Credit Sales:*** Distributors may not sell beer or wine to retailers on
22 credit. WAC 314-13-015; RCW 66.28.010; WAC 314-20-090; WAC 314-12-
23 140(3).

- 1 (e) ***Ban on Volume Discounts***: Distributors may not offer volume discounts when
2 selling beer or wine to retailers. RCW 66.28.180(2)(d) & (3)(b); RCW
3 66.28.170; WAC 314-12-140(3).
- 4 (f) ***“Delivered Pricing” Requirement***: Distributors must sell beer and wine at the
5 same “delivered” price to all retailers, even if the retailer pays the freight and
6 picks up the goods itself. RCW 66.28.180(2)(h)(ii).
- 7 (g) ***“Central Warehousing” Ban***: Washington prohibits retailers from storing or
8 taking delivery of beer and wine at a central warehouse. RCW
9 66.28.180(2)(h)(ii). Washington also prohibits retailers from operating a
10 warehouse that includes wine (RCW 66.24.185(4)), and has adopted a
11 regulation that limits the output of wine from warehouses. WAC 314-24-
12 220(5).
- 13 (h) ***“Minimum Mark-Up” Requirements***: With limited exceptions, manufacturers
14 of beer and wine must charge at least 10 percent more than their cost of
15 production when they sell products to distributors, and distributors must charge
16 at least 10 percent more than their cost of acquisition when they resell beer and
17 wine to retailers. RCW 66.28.010(2); RCW 66.28.180(2)(d) & (3)(b).
- 18 (i) ***Ban on Retailer-to-Retailer Sales***: Washington prohibits retailers from selling
19 beer and wine to other retailers.² RCW 66.28.070; WAC 314-13-010.
- 20
21
22

23 ² As discussed in the conclusions of law below, the Court concludes that Costco’s challenge to
24 Washington’s ban on retailer-to-retailer sales of beer and wine should be dismissed as a matter of law
25 because this policy is a unilateral restraint and is not preempted by the Sherman Act. As a result, the
Court’s discussion of the “challenged restraints” in the findings of fact should not be construed as
including the ban on retailer-to-retailer sales.

Overview of Washington's Regulatory System

2. Following the repeal of Prohibition in 1933, Washington adopted the "Washington State Liquor Act," which the parties also referred to as the "Steele Act." This legislation, which took effect in January 1934, established the Washington State Liquor Control Board (LCB). The Liquor Act directed the LCB to establish "state liquor stores." Consistent with this mandate, the LCB operates liquor stores throughout the state that sell distilled spirits, as well as beer and wine. Private retailers such as Costco may also sell beer and wine, but may not sell spirits.

3. Some of the challenged restraints have been in effect, in varying forms, since the 1930s. Other restraints have been added more recently.

4. With the adoption of the Liquor Act in 1934, Washington adopted a "three-tier" system for the distribution of beer, a system that was later extended to wine. A "three tier" system consists of the following levels: manufacturer, distributor, and retailer. Under a three-tier system, manufacturers sell products to distributors, who in turn sell the products to retailers.

5. The three-tier system in Washington has changed since 1934. For instance, prior to this litigation the Washington State Legislature allowed Washington beer and wine manufacturers (but not out-of-state manufacturers) to sell their products directly to retailers, without using separate distributors. Costco challenged this policy to the extent that it prevented out-of-state manufacturers from selling beer and wine directly to retailers.

6. In December 2005, the Court held that Washington's policy of allowing in-state beer and wine manufacturers to sell their products directly to retailers, while prohibiting out-of-state manufacturers from doing the same, violated the Commerce Clause to the United States Constitution. To ensure equal treatment of in-state and out-of-state manufacturers, the Court provided the State Legislature with several months to either withdraw the direct sales privilege from in-state manufacturers or extend the direct sales privilege to out-of-state manufacturers. The day before the trial in this matter ended, Washington's governor signed legislation that extended the direct sales

1 privilege to out-of-state retailers. This legislation includes a “sunset” provision, meaning that most
2 provisions will expire by June 30, 2008 unless they are renewed. See 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 302.

3 7. Many of the restraints challenged in this case are codified under RCW 66.28.180. This
4 section of the Revised Code of Washington includes the following “intent” language, which was
5 adopted in 1995:

6 Intent: This section is enacted, pursuant to the authority of this state under the twenty-first
7 amendment to the United States Constitution, to promote the public’s interest in fostering the
8 orderly and responsible distribution of malt beverages and wine towards effective control of
9 consumption; to promote the fair and efficient three-tier system of distribution of such
beverages; and to confirm existing [Liquor Control] board rules as the clear expression of state
policy to regulate the manner of selling and pricing of wine and malt beverages by licensed
suppliers and distributors.

10 RCW 66.28.180(1). This language was proposed by the WBWWA and subsequently adopted by the
11 Legislature.

12 8. The LCB currently describes its mission as follows: “The mission of the Liquor Control
13 Board is to serve the public by preventing the misuse of alcohol and tobacco through controlled
14 distribution, enforcement, and education; and provide excellent customer service by operating
15 efficient, convenient and profitable retail stores.”

16 9. Defendants suggest that Washington’s regulatory system should be regarded as
17 reasonable because there has been a “lack of significant concern voiced by any of the various groups
18 interested in the regulation of beer and wine distribution and sales” and an “absence of any public
19 outcry for more or less regulation, or for higher or lower prices for beer and wine.” (Dkt. No. 147 at
20 9). However, through this lawsuit Costco has plainly expressed significant concern about various
21 aspects of the regulatory system. In addition, concerns about abusive alcohol consumption in recent
22 years has led to the establishment of Alcohol Impact Areas in certain parts of the state.

23 Temperance

24 10. The Washington State Legislature has not used the term “temperance” to describe the
25 purpose of any of the challenged restraints. However, the Legislature has stated RCW 66.28.180 is

1 intended to promote “effective control of consumption,” a statement that may be interpreted as an
2 expression of the state’s interest in promoting temperance. In the context of alcohol consumption, the
3 term “temperance” may be understood as “restrained or moderate indulgence.” Black’s Law
4 Dictionary (5th ed. 1979).

5 11. Washington does not seek to promote “temperance” by promoting abstention or by
6 reducing overall consumption of beer and wine. Indeed, the state actively promotes its domestic beer
7 and wine industries and seeks to serve overall lawful demand for beer and wine.

8 12. The parties have stipulated that “[o]n average, prices of beer and wine in Washington
9 are somewhat higher than they would be in the absence of the restraints” challenged in this lawsuit.
10 (Dkt. 122 at 3). The amount of this average increase in beer and wine prices was not clearly
11 established at trial. Defendants maintain that the challenged restraints promote temperance by
12 increasing the average price of beer and wine in Washington state.

13 13. Although the challenged restraints result on average in somewhat higher prices for beer
14 and wine, this fact does not mean that all retailers pay higher prices for beer and wine than they would
15 without the challenged restraints. Instead, the evidence suggests that the restraints allow some
16 retailers to pay lower prices for beer and wine than they would without the restraints, while other
17 retailers pay higher prices that they would without the restraints.

18 14. In general, small retailers and retailers in remote locations tend to obtain lower prices
19 for beer and wine than they would without the restraints because distributors must charge uniform
20 prices to all retailers, regardless of actual delivery costs or the volume of products purchased. In
21 effect, the restraints tend to make beer and wine more affordable for higher-cost retailers (such as
22 small convenience stores or remote retailers), while raising prices for other retailers (such as large
23 retailers).

24 15. The Court is not persuaded that the state effectively promotes temperance by lowering
25 the cost of beer and wine for some retailers, while raising the price of beer and wine for other retailers.

1 Indeed, this policy would appear to increase consumption by making it less expensive for consumers
2 to obtain beer and wine at the most convenient and easily accessible locations.

3 16. There is no persuasive evidence that the purpose of any of the challenged restraints was
4 to promote temperance by raising average beer and wine prices. Prior to this litigation, neither the
5 State Legislature nor the LCB expressed such a purpose. LCB member Vera Ing testified that it is not
6 the LCB's policy to generally raise prices in order to reduce consumption of beer and wine. (Ing.
7 Dep. at 17). Ms. Ing also testified that the LCB has "no mandate to increase or eliminate or reduce
8 consumption." (Ing Dep. at 24). When the LCB was asked in interrogatories to explain how the
9 challenged restraints were necessary, effective, or sufficient in promoting temperance, the LCB
10 responded by stating that the question "assum[ed] facts not in evidence, specifically, that the
11 prohibitions and requirements at issue in this lawsuit have the goal . . . of promoting temperance."
12 (Ex. 245 at 4).

13 17. The LCB has sometimes opposed efforts to increase the prices for wine at state liquor
14 stores. In 1981, for instance, the LCB opposed a legislative proposal to increase wine prices in state
15 stores, noting that "state liquor stores sell wine cheaper than grocery stores" and that under the
16 proposed measure "[c]onsumers would suffer. Right now an estimated 500,000 people . . . choose to
17 buy their wine at state stores because prices are lower." (Ex. 60). Similarly, the LCB opposed a
18 proposal in 1975 to eliminate the state's role in wine sales, arguing that "[i]f the move to take the state
19 out of the wine business is successful, the consumer will pay higher prices for wine." (Ex. 51). Such
20 statements do not reflect a consistent view by the LCB that higher wine prices are desirable or
21 necessary to promote temperance.

22 18. The Court is not persuaded that the challenged restraints are effective in promoting
23 temperance, whether viewed individually or as a whole. To be sure, the evidence at trial indicated that
24 Washington has one of the lowest rates in the country for per capita ethanol consumption per drinker,
25 even though Washington ranks well above the national average in terms of the percentage of the

1 population who consume alcohol. As a result, it appears Washington residents who consume alcohol
2 tend to drink more moderately than alcohol consumers who live in most other states. However, there
3 is no persuasive evidence that the Washington's relatively low rates of ethanol consumption per
4 drinker are due to any of the challenged restraints, either viewed individually or as a whole.

5 19. There has been little if any research or careful study on whether the type of restraints
6 challenged in this litigation are effective in promoting temperance. Dr. Frank Chaloupka, an expert
7 witness offered by Defendants, indicated that he was not aware of any published studies regarding the
8 impact of the types of policies at issue in this case on alcohol consumption. (Ex. 581 at 16). In his
9 writings, Dr. Chaloupka has also noted that "[i]n general, resulting in part from legal challenges
10 initiated by alcoholic beverage wholesalers or retailers, state laws and regulations limiting competition
11 in the alcoholic beverage markets have been relaxed over time." He indicates that "empirical evidence
12 on the impact of changes in these policies on alcoholic beverage prices, drinking, and its consequences
13 is almost nonexistent. Clearly, more research is needed to fully understand the impact of the complex
14 and varied policies that affect alcoholic beverage distribution, marketing, and pricing on the retail
15 prices of these beverages." (Ex. 337 at 547).

16 20. The analyses offered by Dr. Chaloupka do not provide convincing evidence that the
17 challenged restraints are effective in promoting temperance. In these analyses, Dr. Chaloupka
18 concluded that the elimination of certain policies in Nebraska (price posting for wine and spirits and a
19 ban on quantity discounts) and Delaware (a ban on quantity discounts on beer, wine, and spirits)
20 resulted in higher rates of overall alcohol consumption than would have resulted if the restraints had
21 remained in place. However, wine consumption in Nebraska actually decreased significantly after the
22 restraints in that state were eliminated. In addition, Delaware is a small state located near
23 Philadelphia, meaning that cross-border purchases of alcohol likely result in a significant percentage of
24 alcohol sold in the state. The Court finds the critique of Dr. Chaloupka's analyses offered by
25 Plaintiff's expert Michael Moore to be persuasive.

21. Washington has adopted a number of policies that may contribute to the state's moderate rates of ethanol consumption per drinker. Among other things, the state exercises monopoly control over wholesale and retail sales of spirits, imposes relatively high excise taxes on beer and wine, has adopted policies targeting drinking and driving and youth access to alcoholic beverages, and has adopted rules allowing the implementation of "Alcohol Impact Areas." As Plaintiff's expert Michael Moore notes, "it is impossible to separately identify the effects of the policies at issue [in this litigation] from all of the other policies" adopted by Washington. (Ex. 240 at 16).

22. Even if the Court were to find that the challenged restraints had some effect in promoting temperance by raising average beer and wine prices, the Court finds that the state's interest in promoting temperance in this manner does not outweigh the federal interest in promoting competition under the Sherman Act. If the State desires to promote temperance by artificially increasing beer and wine prices, the State could readily achieve that goal in a manner that does not run afoul of the Sherman Act. Most obviously, the State could adopt higher excise taxes on beer and wine.

Orderly Market Conditions

23. The Washington Legislature has expressed its intent "to promote the public's interest in fostering the orderly and responsible distribution of malt beverages and wine. . . ." RCW 66.28.180(1). This statement can be construed as an expression of the Washington Legislature's intent to promote orderly market conditions for beer and wine.

24. It is not clear what the term "orderly market conditions" or "orderly distribution" encompasses. As one court recently noted that "[a]s for 'ensuring orderly markets,' we are not sure what that phrase means." Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1115 (11th Cir. 2002).

25. Defendants did not provide a clear or consistent definition of the terms "orderly marketing" or "orderly distribution." LCB member Vera Ing defined "orderly distribution" as the "three-tier system" and stated that orderly distribution "would be the ability to supervise" and "clearly

1 articulated procedures.” (Ing Dep. at 167). Dr. Kenneth Casavant, an economist, defined “orderly
2 marketing” as “asking the market to have the prices reflect the cost of production” and to have the
3 market avoid “gluts and scarcities.” In their proposed findings and conclusions of law, Defendants
4 suggest that the Court should find that “orderly marketing of beer and wine refers to a system that
5 promotes relative price uniformity, relative price stability, and relatively wide availability with respect
6 to beer and wine.” (Dkt. No. 147 at 6).

7 26. Under a “three-tier” system, beer and wine is sold from a manufacturer to a
8 distributor, who in turn sells the product to a retailer. A three-tier system does not require the
9 “posting” and “holding” of beer and wine prices, nor does it require uniform prices to be charged to all
10 retailers or “delivered pricing” restraints. Similarly, a three-tier system does not require minimum
11 mark-ups, a ban on credit sales and volume discounts, or a ban on central warehousing of beer and
12 wine by retailers.

13 27. The challenged restraints are not effective in ensuring that prices of beer and wine
14 reflect the cost of production. Washington law prohibits below-cost sales of beer and wine, and this
15 restraint is not challenged in this litigation. To be sure, the challenged restraints – in particular, the
16 price “posting” requirement – may aid the LCB in enforcing Washington’s ban on below-cost sales of
17 beer and wine. For instance, if the LCB receives complaints that a distributor is selling products
18 below cost, the LCB can review the distributor’s posted price and compare it to the price charged to
19 an individual retailer. However, the state could enforce its below-cost sales law without requiring
20 posting of prices. Most obviously, the state could simply require suppliers and distributors to keep all
21 purchase and sales records on site for inspection by the LCB.

22 28. There is little evidence that the challenged restraints are effective in preventing “gluts”
23 of beer and wine in Washington. At trial, Defendants appeared to suggest that the 10 percent
24 minimum mark-ups prevent gluts in the market. However, the evidence at trial indicated that
25 distributors typically mark-up the prices of beer and wine products by more than 10 percent. Indeed,

1 Defendants state that “[t]he minimum mark-up requirements have virtually no impact on prices
2 actually charged, because suppliers and distributors routinely mark their products up by far more than
3 10%.” (Dkt. No. 147 at 13). The 10 percent minimum mark-up may prevent distributors from
4 “dumping” beer products on the market at lower prices when the products are nearing their expiration
5 dates. However, the evidence does not suggest that the amount of beer that may be sold in such
6 situations is sufficient to create any appreciable “gluts” in the marketplace.

7 29. The Court is not persuaded that the challenged restraints are effective in preventing
8 scarcities in the beer or wine markets in Washington state. If the restraints were not in place, there is
9 no apparent reason why beer and wine would not distributed in an orderly manner throughout the
10 state, just like other common consumer items. There is no evidence that states that have not adopted
11 policies similar to Washington have experienced scarcities of beer or wine.

12 30. The challenged restraints ensure that all retailers are able to purchase beer and wine
13 from distributors at the same prices offered to larger retailers. The uniform pricing requirement (as
14 reinforced by the delivered pricing requirement, as well as the bans on volume discounts, credit sales,
15 and central warehousing) ensures that a distributor must charge the same price for a particular product
16 to every retailer, regardless of actual delivery costs or other factors that may justify different prices. In
17 the absence of the restraints, it is likely that smaller and more remote retailers would tend to pay
18 somewhat higher prices for beer and wine than larger and more economically-efficient retailers.

19 31. The Court regards these restraints as only minimally effective in promoting the state’s
20 interest in “orderly market conditions.” In a sense, the challenged restraints make the beer and wine
21 market in Washington somewhat more “orderly” by ensuring that all licensed retailers, regardless of
22 their size, location, or efficiency, are able to purchase beer and wine at the same price from any given
23 distributor. However, there is no persuasive evidence that smaller or remote retailers would be unable
24 to survive economically without the challenged restraints or that they would otherwise be unable to
25 purchase or profitably sell beer or wine. The Court finds persuasive Costco’s argument that all

1 manner of goods, from potato chips to chewing gum, find their way to even the most remote parts of
2 the state.

3 32. To the limited extent that the challenged restraints may be effective in promoting the
4 state's interest in "orderly market conditions" by requiring uniform pricing to retailers, the Court finds
5 that the state's interests are outweighed by the federal interest in promoting competition. As the
6 Supreme Court has noted, a state's "unsubstantiated interest in protecting small retailers 'simply [is]
7 not of the same stature as the goals of the Sherman Act.'" 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335,
8 350 (1987).

9 Raising Revenue

10 33. The Court finds that the challenged restraints, viewed either individually or as a whole,
11 are not effective in advancing the state's interest in raising revenue. There is no persuasive evidence
12 that the challenged restraints play an appreciable role in raising revenue for the state or in ensuring
13 efficient collection of taxes. Taxes on alcohol products can be collected at both the retailer and
14 distributor level, just as sales taxes for other goods.

15 34. If the state in fact wishes to promote temperance by artificially increasing the price of
16 beer and wine, the challenged restraints appear to result in a significant amount of lost potential
17 revenue for the state. The state could increase beer and wine prices by raising excise taxes, an action
18 that would increase the state's revenues. By contrast, the challenged restraints increase the average
19 price of beer and wine in a manner that leaves most of the increased revenue to beer and wine
20 wholesalers, rather than the state. As Defendants' expert Frank Chaloupka testified, "somebody gets
21 the money from the higher prices" and "the majority of the surplus would end up with the
22 wholesalers."

Conclusions of Law

Ban on Retailer-to-Retailer Sales

1. In general, Washington prohibits retailers from selling beer and wine to other retailers. This restraint is imposed unilaterally by the state of Washington. Unlike the other restraints at issue in this case, this policy does not grant a degree of private regulatory power to private actors. “A restraint imposed unilaterally by government does not become concerted action within the meaning of the [Sherman Act] simply because it has a coercive effect upon parties who must obey the law.” Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 266 (1986). Such unilateral restraints on trade imposed purely by the state do not run afoul of the Sherman Act. Therefore, the Court dismisses Costco’s claims regarding the ban on retailer-to-retailer sales of beer and wine.

Other Challenged Restraints

2. On summary judgment, the Court previously determined that the remaining restraints challenged by Costco are irreconcilably in conflict with the federal Sherman Act, are “hybrid” in nature, and are not shielded by the state action immunity doctrine. See Dkt. Nos. 113 and 119. The evidence at trial confirmed these determinations. For the reasons stated in its prior summary judgment orders, the Court finds that Costco has met its burden on the issues for which it has the burden of proof.

3. As an affirmative defense, Defendants argue that the challenged restraints may be preserved as valid exercises of state power under the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution. Because this is an affirmative defense, the Court concludes that Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that the challenged restraints are shielded by the Twenty-first Amendment. See, e.g., Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1115 n.16 (state has burden of proof on a Twenty-first Amendment defense).

4. “The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor of competition is both familiar and substantial.” California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97,

1 110 (1980). As the Supreme Court has noted, “[a]ntitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
 2 particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.” Id. (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.,
 3 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)). Although the Sherman Act is a statute rather than a constitutional
 4 provision, “Congress ‘exercis[ed] all the power it possessed’ under the Commerce Clause when it
 5 approved the Sherman Act.” Midcal, 445 U.S. at 111. As a result, courts “must acknowledge the
 6 importance of the Act’s procompetition policy.” Id.

7 5. The Twenty-first Amendment, which repealed Prohibition, provides that “[t]he
 8 transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery
 9 or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” This
 10 provision has been construed as “grant[ing] the State virtually complete control over whether to
 11 permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.” Midcal, 445
 12 U.S. at 110.

13 6. The Supreme Court has emphasized that “there is no bright line between federal and
 14 state powers of liquor.” Id. In cases where the federal and state powers are in conflict, “[t]he
 15 question in each case is ‘whether the interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to
 16 the powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation may prevail, notwithstanding
 17 that its requirements directly conflict with express federal policies.’” 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479
 18 U.S. 335, 347 (1987). The Supreme Court has identified several “core interests” reserved to the
 19 states under the Twenty-first Amendment. These interests include “promoting temperance, ensuring
 20 orderly market conditions, and raising revenue.” North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432
 21 (1990).

22 7. The Court concludes that the challenged restraints are not preserved by the Twenty-
 23 first Amendment to the Constitution. As discussed above, these restraints are either ineffective or only
 24 of minimal effectiveness in promoting temperance, ensuring orderly markets, or raising revenue. To
 25 the extent that the restraints may have a minimal effect in advancing the state’s core interests under the

Twenty-first Amendment, the state's interests do not outweigh the federal interest in promoting competition under the Sherman Act. Therefore, the Court concludes that the challenged restraints are preempted by the Sherman Act.

8. The LCB should be enjoined from enforcing the following policies:

- a. **“Post and Hold”** policies that require manufacturers and distributors of beer and wine to “post” the prices of their products with the LCB and to “hold” those prices for a full calendar month. See RCW 66.28.180(2)-(3); WAC 314-20-100(2) & (5); WAC 314-24-190(2) & (5).
- b. **Uniform Pricing** policies that require beer and wine distributors to sell their products to every retailer at the same price. See RCW 66.28.170; RCW 28.180(2) & (3); WAC 314-12-140; WAC 314-20-100(2), (4) & (5); WAC 314-24-190(2), (4) & (5).
- c. **Bans on Credit Sales** of beer and wine. See WAC 314-13-015; RCW 66.28.010; WAC 314-20-090; WAC 314-12-140(3).
- d. **Ban on Volume Discounts** for sales of beer and wine. See RCW 66.28.180(2)(d) & 3(b); RCW 66.28.170; WAC 314-12-140(3).
- e. **“Delivered Pricing”** policies that require distributors to sell beer and wine at the same “delivered” price to all retailers, even if the retailer pays the freight and picks up the goods itself. See RCW 66.28.180(2)(h)(ii).
- f. **“Central Warehousing” Bans** that prohibit retailers from storing beer and wine at a central warehouse or from operating a warehouse that includes wine, see RCW 66.28.180(2)(h)(ii) and RCW 66.24.185(4), as well as restrictions

that would limit the output of wine from a central warehouse operated by a retailer. See WAC 314-24-220(5).³

g. **Minimum Mark-Up** policies that impose mandatory 10 percent mark-ups on the sale of beer and wine by manufacturers and distributors. See RCW 66.28.010(2); RCW 66.28.180(2)(d) & (3)(b).

9. The Court may enjoin antitrust violations pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 26. The Court finds that it is not necessary to reach Costco's request for relief for antitrust violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.⁴

Stay of Judgment

The Court's order will require some significant changes in Washington's existing system for beer and wine sales and distribution. As a result, the Court will stay the judgment in this case during the 30-day period allotted for Defendants to file a notice of appeal. This will give the state an opportunity to assess its options while contemplating appeal. If Defendants wish to seek an extension of a stay beyond that time frame, they should file a motion to do so.

³ The restraints that prevent retailers from operating warehouses that include wine (RCW 66.24.185(4)) and limit output from wine warehouses (WAC 314-24-220(5)) were not explicitly addressed in the Court's previous orders on summary judgment motions, largely because Costco did not identify those restraints in its complaint. However, Costco raised both restraints in its summary judgment briefing and the Court granted an oral motion by Costco at trial to conform the pleadings to the evidence. Therefore, to the extent that RCW 66.24.185(4) and WAC 314-24-220(5) would prevent retailers from operating central warehouses that include wine and would limit the output of wine from a central warehouse operated by a retailer, the Court finds that these restraints are analytically indistinct from those specifically mentioned the Court's previous summary judgment rulings.

⁴ The parties have provided virtually no briefing on Costco's § 1983 claims. It is questionable in any case that a § 1983 claim may be based on violations of federal antitrust laws. See, e.g., Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 601 F. Supp. 892, 913 n.29 (D. Md. 1985) ("the Court does not believe that violation of the antitrust laws may be the basis for a § 1983 action"); Bonollo Rubbish Removal, Inc. v. Town of Franklin, 886 F. Supp. 955, 965-66 (D. Mass. 1995) (similar); see generally City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005) (discussing limitations on maintaining Section 1983 actions based on violations of federal law).

**Entry of Judgment on Costco's Constitutional Claim
Regarding Direct Sales by In-State and Out-of-State Manufacturers**

In a prior order, the Court held that Washington's policy of allowing in-state beer and wine manufacturers to sell their products directly to retailers, while prohibiting out-of-state manufacturers from doing the same, violates the Commerce Clause to the United States Constitution. The Court stayed entry of judgment on that claim to permit the Washington Legislature a reasonable period of time to either withdraw the direct sales privilege from in-state manufacturers or to extend the privilege to out-of-state manufacturers. The Legislature responded by passing a measure that extended the direct sales privilege to out-of-state manufacturers. As such, Costco's challenge to the ban on direct sales by out-of-state manufacturers is arguably moot.

At closing arguments, however, Costco requested that the Court enter a final judgment holding that Washington's former ban on direct sales of beer and wine by out-of-state manufacturers violates the Commerce Clause. Both Costco and the WBWWA suggested that the challenge to this former policy is not moot because the legislation signed by the Governor includes a "sunset provision," meaning that the legislation will expire by June 30, 2008 unless it is renewed.

The Ninth Circuit has noted that "[o]ur circuit, perhaps following the lead of the Supreme Court, has issued somewhat confused pronouncements regarding mootness generally, and mootness in the context of repealed or amended statutes in particular." Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003). On the one hand, the Ninth Circuit has announced that "[a]s a general rule, if a challenged law is repealed or expires, the case becomes moot." Native Village of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1994). At the same time, the Supreme Court has held that "[i]t is well settled that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice." City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982) (finding that challenge to city ordinance was not mooted by changes in challenged law). The Ninth Circuit has indicated that "[o]ne factor to consider in deciding

1 if a case is moot as a result of subsequent statutory amendments is whether the governmental entity is
2 likely to reenact the offending provision” Coral Const. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 928 (9th
3 Cir. 1991). In addition, “even if the government is unlikely to reenact the provision, a case is not
4 easily mooted where the government is otherwise unconstrained should it later desire to reenact the
5 provision.” Id.

6 Here, the State Legislature has voluntarily ended – at least for the next two years –
7 Washington’s policy of allowing in-state beer and wine manufacturers to sell products directly to
8 retailers, while denying that privilege to out-of-state manufacturers. However, it is apparent the State
9 Legislature only adopted this change because this Court granted summary judgment on Costco’s claim
10 that the former policy violated the Commerce Clause. The State Legislature also included a sunset
11 provision in the legislation, meaning that the previous system of discriminating between in-state and
12 out-of-state manufacturers will return unless the Legislature affirmatively acts in the future. Given
13 these circumstances, the Court finds that Costco’s challenge to Washington’s former policy of
14 allowing only in-state manufacturers to sell beer and wine directly to retailers is not moot. The State
15 Legislature has only adopted a temporary change in the challenged policy as a result of this litigation.
16 As such, there is a reasonable likelihood that the former policy may be re-enacted, either through
17 action or inaction by the Legislature. Therefore, the Court will direct the entry of final judgment on
18 Costco’s challenge to this policy.

19 Conclusion

20 The restraints challenged by Costco are plainly anti-competitive, and there is no dispute that
21 these restraints increase the average cost of beer and wine in Washington. Defendants argue that the
22 restraints should nonetheless be upheld as a valid exercise of the state’s power under the Twenty-first
23 Amendment, notwithstanding their anti-competitive nature. However, the effectiveness of these
24 restraints in advancing the state’s interests under the Twenty-first Amendment has largely gone
25

1 unstudied, and there is little evidence that the restraints are effective in advancing the state's interests
2 in promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, or raising revenue.

3 To the extent that the restraints may have a minimal effect in advancing the state's interests
4 under the Twenty-first Amendment, the Court finds that the state's interests do not trump the federal
5 interest in promoting competition. The citizens of this nation have long relied upon a healthy
6 competitive market to distribute goods efficiently and economically, a policy that is embodied by the
7 Sherman Act of 1890. In light of the minimal effectiveness of the challenged restraints in advancing
8 the state's interests under the Twenty-first Amendment, these restraints must yield to the national
9 goals of a competitive, free market economy. However, the Court's ruling does not leave the state
10 powerless to achieve its legitimate interests of promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market
11 conditions for beer and wine, and raising revenue. For example, the state may raise revenue through
12 the sale of alcohol and the collection of taxes, control who is selling alcohol by enforcement of
13 licensing, and educate the public on the societal costs of abusive alcohol consumption.

14 The Court's ruling will require changes in Washington's regulatory system for beer and wine.
15 It is the job of the Washington Legislature and not this Court to determine how to best revise
16 Washington's system in a manner that is consistent with the United States Constitution and federal
17 law. The Court urges the Legislature to do so with dispatch.

18 The Court will stay the judgment in this case during the 30-day time period allotted to
19 Defendants to file a notice of appeal. If Defendants wish to seek an extension of the stay beyond that
20 time frame, they should file an appropriate motion.

21 The clerk is directed to provide copies of this order to all counsel of record.

22 Dated: April 21, 2006.

23 s/Marsha J. Pechman
24 Marsha J. Pechman
25 United States District Judge